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ABSTRACT

Once a vibrant symbol of the Los Angeles region, the
Pacific Electric Railway is popularly believed to have been

the victim of a conspiracy of automobile related industries
intent upon destroying all sources of competition.

Examina

tion of the history of the region's electric trolley system,

however, exposes this theory as a myth.

The author argues

that the streetcars disappeared because area residents

consistently demonstrated a preference for private automo

biles and the regulatory agency governing the trolleys
repeatedly made decisions which created an environment in

which rail-based mass transit could not compete.
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-introdugtion

Pacific ElectriG (PE), also known as the "Red Cars"
for its distinctive red and orange color scheme, was an

important element of the Los Angeles Basin's transportation
system during the first haIf of the twentieth century.

It

was not the first trolley system to serve Los Angeles, but
it was the most successful and enduring.

Just as cable cars

are used to symbolize San Francisco, across the country the

appearance of the Red Cars in the background of a movie or
photograph immediately set the scene in Los Angeles.

At its

height, the trolley's lines stretched from Santa Monica to
Redlands and from San Fernando to Orange County.

The Pa

cific Electric was a simple part of Southern California life
for sixty years, but as most things do, it gradually lost
its utility over the years as area residents abandoned the

trolley in favor of the comfort and convenience of their
personal automobiles.

This paper will explore the history of the Pacific
Electric and, to a lesser extent, the Los Angeles Railway

(LARY) and will explain their roles and operations through
the first half of the century.

The author will show how the

Pacific Electric grew from a tool to promote real estate

development to an extensive railway system offering passen

ger and freight services to the entire Los Angeles Basin,
and how it came to be a nationally recognized symbol of the

region.

Also explained will be the trolleys' struggles to

survive against competition from autolnobiles and how public

policy decisions favoring increased access for automobiles
negatively affected trolley efficiency.

Also addressed will

be the impact on the streetcar companies of the development

of multiple business districts in the communities surround

ing Los Angeles as well the disastrous effects of decisions
made by the California Public Utilities Commissioh,(CPUC) to
reject repeated requests for fare increases.

The popular idea that General Motors masterminded the
destruction of Los Angeles' streetcar system will be exam
ined and rejected.

Instead, the author will show throughout

the study that decisions made locally by governing agencies
and private citizens were the fundamental cause of the

system's failure.

Finally, we will see how rapid rail

transit has returried to Los Angeles, note some of the dif
ferences between the old and new systems, and explain why
the current system may have a better chance at long-term
success.

THE RED CARS

The Creation of the Pacific Electric

In 1901, Henry Edwards Huntlngton left an executive
position at the Southern PaGific in San Francisco to head

the newly incorporated Pacific Electric Railway,

Huntlngton

was the nephew and part heir to Collis P. Huntington, the

railroad magnate who, along with Leland Stanford, Charles
Crocker and Mark Hopkins, headed up the Central Pacific
Railroad and built the western portion of the transcontinen
tal railroad in the 1860s.

The Central Pacific later reor

ganized itself and several of its other railroads under the
Southern Pacific Railroad moniker in 1884 and Collis became

its president in 1890.

Henry E. Huntington arrived in

California in 1892 to serve as his uncle's personal assis
tant, and by 1899 he had become a vice-president of the

railroad.

After the death of his uncle in 1900, Henry left

the Southern Pacific and moved to Southern California to

oversee his personal business concerns.

Huntington purchased the Los Angeles Railway (LARY), an

intraurban electric trolley line, a couple of years before
the creation of the Pacific Electric, but the idea of devel

oping an entirely new, potentialiy profitable system from
the ground up "appealed to the builder in Huntington."^

He

envisioned an ambitious and prosperous future for his new
enterprise.

Huntington realized that his new railway system would

be extremely expensive both to construct and to operate and

decided that there was quicker gain in developing arid sell-'
ing the land close to the newly laid tracks.

With this in

mind, he organized the Huntington Land and Improvement

Company soon after arriving in Los Angeles.

While the

owners of preceding streetcar companies had recognized the

potential of developing land parcels adjoining their tracks,
Huntingtori's personal wealth made him unusually qualified to

take advantage of the opportunity.^

As he could provide the

capital necessary to construct the railway, he was able to
orchestrate the Construction of the lines to coincide with

the releases of his properties to the market.

In the highly

competitive real estate market of the period, the availabil

ity of transportation in and out of the city gave Hunting
ton's developments an edge over his competitors.

Further

more, because he directed where the lines would go, he could
purchase inexpensively land which had been deemed undesir

able because of its distance from the city center, subdivide

it, provide it with water and power from his own utility
companies, construct a Pacific Electric line to service it,
and then sell the greatly improved properties for a nice

profit.^

His buyers benefitted from haying homes in quiet

communities far removed from the city but conveniently
connected to it by the Red Cars.
When compared to other interurbans the Pacific Electric

was also unique in that Huntington's immediate objective in

building the railway was not to make a profit from the
streetcar itself, but to use it to make his real estate

developments attractive and accessible to potential buyers.
In other words, the Pacific Electric was hot built with the

specific intent to connect existing communities with an
efficient method of transportation; its initial purpose was

to promote real estate sales.^

Only after it had served

that end was it expected to generate profit through its
operations.

Interurbans in eastern cities, on the other

hand, were constructed to connect existing communities with

an efficient transportation system.

They were built with

the explicit intent to transport people between two or more
communities.

The Los Angeles Railway, also owned by Huntington, had

a different function than the PE.

LARY served those already

in the city as an intraurban transportation system providing

Los Angeles residents with a convenient method of traveling
about the city.

Its cars traveled on tracks running down

the center of downtown streets, loading and unloading pas

sengers at stops in the middle of the street.

Commuters

arrived in the city from newly developed Huntington proper
ties on the interurban Pacific Electric lines and trans

ferred onto LARY lines to get even closer to their final
destinations.

Trolley systems became popular nationwide because in

addition to providing a simple means of moving people, they

permitted a city to expand gepgraphically as they allowed:
greater number of people to travel comfortably a longer

distance within the "accessibility radius!' (the distance one

could travel within a thirty to forty-five minute period) of
the city than they could When transportation was limited to

foot or horse.®

In Southern California, the interurban had

an even greater impact oh the region•s deveiopment because
the population settled where its routes led.®

The Pacific Electric had a deep, long-lasting effect on
the Los Angeles Basin.

It allowed average, working-class

people to move into the suburbs and was instrumental iri the

development of the Southland's distinctive, and early,

sprawling nature (what Crump calls the "City of Southern
California"' in which there is ho dominant central business
district and communities blend into each other until one

cannot tel1 where orie city begins and the other ends).
Huntington was so consistently successful in his real

estate projects that whenever he became involved in a devel
opment deal his actions were closely monitored by resource
ful entrepreneurs.

In July 1905, for example, Huntington

announced the purchase of the Redondo Improvement Company
which owned 90% of the land in Redondo Beach a:s well as the

Los Angeles and Redondo Railway.

This immediately triggered

a small laind boom in which a piece of phoperty would change
hands several times in a single day, each time being sold at
a higher price.

The boom only lasted about two weeks but
■

'■/
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during that time, Huntington netted approximately three
million dollars.®

Huntington's methods met with repeated success.

Wher

ever the Pacific EleGtric went, communities expanded and
thrived.

The population growth of several cities during the

period of the Pacific Eleptric's arrival ia shown in

Table 1.

Note how Burbank's population more than tripled

between 1900 and 1910 as the Pacific Electric arrived and

expanded its services between 1904 and 1911.

Alhambra,

which didn't even exist in 1900, grew to more than 5,000
residents by 1910 after the Red Gars arrived in 1902.

Compare this rapid growth in Alhambra to the steady increase
in San Fernando where the PE did not arrive until 1911.

The

Pacific Electric did not account for all the growth in all
of the cities, but it did make these communities more acces

sible and attractive to potential residents.
When he began constructing the Pacific Electric, Hun

tington allowed for future growth whenever possible.

Per

haps because of his experience with the Southern Pacific, he
decided to build the PE using standard gauge for the tracks

(4* 8%" across), although most other trolley systems used a
narrow gauge (3' 6").

By so doing, the Pacific Electric had

the ability to increase its profitability by utilizing

standard freight cars to engage in the freight trade.®
Entering the freight market, however, would mean that the

Pacific Electric would become an even greater competitive

TABLE 1

Effect of the Pacific Electric's Arrival

on Population in Selected Cities
PE

Towns/Area
Alhambra

1890

.. . .

—

Azusa . . . . . .

—

Burbank Township
Glendale

. . . .

Huntington Beach
Long Beach
Monrovia

2,996
—

1900

1910

Arrives

5,021

1902

863

1,477

1907

3,048

12,255

1904-11

2,746

1904

815

1904

—

■

. . .

564

2,252

17,809

1902

. . . .

907

1,205

3,576

1903

445

1905

Newport Beach . .

—

—

. . . . .

3,634

5,526

10,207

1909-12

Redondo Beach . .

603

855

2,935

1903"

1,110

1,326

2,134

1911

. . . .

1,713

2,501

8,550

1902

Santa Ana . . . .

3,628

4,933

8,429

1905

Santa Monica

. .

1,580

3,057

7,847

circa
1896"

. . . .

585

1,590

4,550

1903

Pomona

San Fernando

Township

. . . .

San Gabriel

Township

Whittier

"Dates mark the arrival of a streetcar line but not the PE.

Source: Glenn Dumke, "The Growth of the Pacific Electric and
Its Influence upon the Development of Southern California to

1911" (M.A. thesis. Occidental College, 1939), p. l21, in
Henry E. Huntinaton and the Creation of Southern California,
William B. Friedricks, (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1992), 154.
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threat to steam railroads such as the Southern Pacific:

The advent of the electric interurban, which
made every car a train, created a dangerous

challenge to the steam railroads. Trolleys
could run frequently and economically stop at
the smallest communities.

In an era when

competition from busses and automobiles was

not a reality electric interurban systems
I

were bringing reduced patronage to the steam
railroads they paralleled elsewhefe in the
nation.

The Pacific Electric's first major interurban route ran

from lios Angeles to Long Beach and was built on a private
right-of-way.

Huntington preferred to construct private

routes even though they were more costly than running tracks

down the center of existing roadways.

The private right-of

ways allowed PE cars to travel swiftly with minimal inter
ference from cross traffic.

They also had the added benefit

of being able to accommodate freight trains at odd hours of
the night with minimal disturbance of local residents.
Whenever practical, Huntington also constructed double
tracks so that the trolleys could travel efficiently and

unopposed at all hours of the day.

Even when the immedi

ate expected volume of traffic on a particular line did not

require double-tracking, Huntington usually graded for it
during the initial construction phase so that the second set
jOf tracks could be easily laid as traffic did become heavy
enough.

Huntington's plans to expand the Pacific Electric's
freight business were never fully realized during the time

he controlled the company.

Edward H. Harriman of the South
9

ern Pacific (SP) was aware of the competitive threat posed
by Huntington and the PaGific Electric to the operations of

his own company.

He watched as Huntington ekpanded the

Pacific Electric's territory and goals, but as long as
Huntington focused on real estate development and the PE's

activities did not unnecessarily interfere with Southern
Pacific business, Harriman chose not to challehge Hunting
ton.

However, when the Pacific Electric's operations began

to encroach on the Southern Pacific's passenger service area

and to expand its freight service, Harriman responded to the
challenge.

In 1903 Harriiaan secured a fifty percent interest in
the PE and a forty-five percent interest in LARY on behalf

of the Southern Pacific^^ by purchasing shares from Hunting-'
ton's business partners who had begun to object to Hunting-

ton's insistence on putting LARY's and the PE's profits back
into the business instead of paying dividends.

They had

invested in the railways to earn a profit, but although the
companies were doing well, they were not paying well.

Although Harriman did not obtain an actual controlling
interest in either of the companies, he was effectively able

to block most of Huntington's efforts to expand the PE's
freight business.

Huntington entertained hopes of expanding the Pacific

Electric's service all the way to San Diego, but Harriman
maneuvered to prevent him from going forward with those

■ 10-
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plans.

Thwarted at each attempt to branch out, Huntington

eventually realized that Harriman and the Southern Pacific
were not going to allow him to expand the Pacific Electric's
operations in any way that could negatively affect the
Southern Pacific's business.

He soon began negotiations

with the SP to separate the ownership of LARY and the Pa

cific Electric so that an agreement could be reached in
which the Southern Pacific would obtain full interest in the

PE and Huntington would gain full interest in LARY.'^^
Negotiations were temporarily halted when Harriman died in
1909 but the deal was finally settled in November 1910.
Although LARY had a much smaller area of operation,
Huntington did not lose in the deal because LARY was actu
ally more profitable than the PE and required less of Hun
tington's personal attention to run.

Ready to retire from

the railroad business, he now shifted his attention toward

more pleasurable pursuits.

He began in earnest to amass a

collection of artwork and books which would eventually

become the basis of the Huntington Library on his estate in
San Marino, California.
With the Red Cars now under its control, the Southern

Pacific began to capitalize on Huntington's foresight by
using the PE routes and standard gauge trackage to augment
its own freight business.

The business was so successful

that in 1911, the first year under Southern Pacific's con

trol, the Pacific Electric's freight revenue was $512,226,

11' ,

and in 1912 the amount more than doubled to reach

$1,203,956.^®

The Southern Pacific continued to expand

passenger services on the system as well.

By 1926 the

Pacific EleGtric had lines running as far east as Redlands,

Riverside, and Corona and stretched south to Santa Ana,
Orange, and Balboa and notth to San Fernando.

In addition to transportation for commuters, the Pa
cific Electric offered special excursiori trips.

Pleasure

seekers who regularly ventured to their favorite beach
picnic areas in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, or Balboa cOuld

ride the Red Gars to the shore.

There was an "Orange Empire

Trolley Trip" which involved a full day's excursion from Los

Angeles to Riverside for lunch and a tour of the Mission Inh
and then a ride up to San Bernardino and Redlands before

returning to Los Angeles.

The most popular tour, however,

was the scenic ride up Mount Lowe north of Pasadena.

Developed by Professor Thaddeus Lowe, the Pasadena and
Mount Lowe Railway first opened to passenger travel in 1893
as a year-round mountain retreat> The trip was made in
stages of which the first and third stages were made in

standard electric trolleys winding their way up the side of
the mountain and offering spectacular vistas.

The secOnd

stage, however, required passengers to break their trolley
ride and transfer to an "incline" car which had been devel

oped by Lowe and an engineer to achieve an elevation change
of more than 1200 feet in less than one-half mile.

12 ^ .■

The

special cars operated on a grade of approximately fifty-nine

percent" in a design now known as a funicular."

Under

LoweV^ management there were dining and sleeping accommoda
tions at the end of each travel stage.

However, by the time

the Southern Pacific acquired the line, only the Mount Lowe

Tavern at the end of the last, stage remained to offer pas

sengers the opportunity to rent a cottage for overnight or
more extended vacations.

Operations Under the Southern Pacific

The Southern Pacific continued to expand the Pacific
Electric's passenger services in the region as well as its

freight services.

The SP further capitalized on the PE's

standard gauge trackage by using some of its lines as a
"switching network" for its own freight operations between

San Pedro's port facilities and Los Angeles.^®
The PE continued to service outlying communities and to

attract passengers by offering transportation to regional

special events.

In 1912, for example, after service to

Pomona had begun, excursion cars were run directly to the
gates of the Los Angeles County fairgrounds.

As soon as the

Pacific Electric reached San Bernardino in 1914, special
service was also provided to the National Orange Show

grounds.^®
By 1926 the Pacific Electric had reached as far east as
Redlands and as far south in the Inland Empire as Corona.
■ ■ 13-'

The travel corridor between Pomona and San Bernardiho was

special to the PE system in several ways.

It ran through a

rural area with comparatively fewer stops than on lines in
heavier populated areas nearer to Los Angeles.

It operated

on a line which carried twice the voltage of the rest of the

system and whiGh made high speeds possible.

More impor^

tantly, it had a protected right-of-way with very few cross

ings.

As the motormen operating the trolleys did not have

to worry about cross-traffic, they could safely accelerate
to speeds of approximately sixty miles per hour, making the

San Bernardino line a true rapid transit provider.

Streetcars in the Spatial Development of the Los Angeles
Region
Los Angeles had, of course, existed prior to the intro
duction of electric streetcars, but, unlike Boston and New

York, it had never developed as a densely populated pedes
trian city.

Furthermore, while interurbans existed and

thrived in other cities, they developed somewhat differently
in Los Angeles because interurban trolley developers in most
cities first had to raise funds through stock sales or
private subscriptions before any track could be laid and
then to build their lines between established towns and

cities.

Huntington, on the other hand, used his trolleys as

a tool to attract custdmers^

His inheritance and the suc

cess of his real estate developments had provided him with
the financial wherewithal to purchase the right-of-ways he
14

needed, build a trolley line, and make it possible for
people to reach his properties in fledgling communities
around the Los Angeles Basin.

Even before Huntington built the Pacific Electric, Los
Angeles* transpprtation system had developed differently
than other urban areas had because, unlike most other Ameri

can cities, it had become an urban center during the Elec
tric Streetcar Era (1890-1920) rather than during the Walk-

ing/Horsecar Era (pre 1800-1890).^^

Cities which developed

during the Walking Era were small and densely populated out
of practical necessity because the primary means of trans

portation available to most inhabitants was walking.

The

radius of the city could only expand out from the center to

a distance that could be comfortably walked in a thirty to
forty-five minute period.

Anything larger made it impracti

cal for workers to travel from their homes to their

workplaces.

By the 1830s steam railroads made it possible for the

wealthy to move to the outskirts of the cities or to nearby

small towns from which they could commute into the city on a
daily basis.

The majority of the population, however, could

not, afford to use the trains, so the limits of most cities
were not much affected by this particular technological
development.

With the introduction of the horsecar, on the

other hand, thin suburban belts began to appear around the
cities* edges.

When electric streetcars were introduced in
■ 15- '

the 1890s, the layout of the typical city changed from a

circular shape to a star pattern as homes and businesses
were built along the corridors formed by streetcar lines
radiating out from the city center.

Because Los Angeles

had developed at the same time as the streetcar, its resi
dents were so dependent on the trolley lines that developers
seldom ventured out more than four blocks from the tracks.

Los Angeles' already low population density had little
opportunity to increase because the streetcar had made it
possible to avoid crowding by spreading outward.

Until the

mid 1920s, the region around Los Angeles was a collection of
autonomous communities of single-family homes on large lots

with distinct separations between residential and business
districts.

Although there were multiple business dis^

tricts in the region during the streetcar era, downtown Los
Angeles was the largest, and it dominated the region as long
as the trolleys were the primary means of transportation and

while their routes radiated out from downtown.^®

This

dominance would change, however, as automobiles became more
popular, sprawling suburban settlement became standard, and

multiple business centers replaced the single dominating
central business district.

Fares, Jitneys and Private Automobiles

Although privately owned and operated, the Pacific
Electric and LARY were often considered and treated as

16

public utilities.

This disparity created problems whenever

the trolley companies appealed to the California Railroad

Commission (later the Public Utilities Commission) for a
fare increase.

Lbs Angeles residents had long harbbred a

deep distrust toward railroads in general which was a result

of the Southern PabifiCs attempts in the 1870s to force the

city to turn over control of a local railroad and to pay the
Southern Pacific a $600,000 "subsidy" to build an SP line

into the otherwise isolated cityv^

The lingering distrust

of the motives of the railroads was evident in the public's
attitude toward them whenever a proposal for increased fares
was presented.

In spite of frequent requests for an increase, LARY's

fare remained at five cents from the earliest years of its
existence until 1926 when, after the Public Utilities Com

mission decided once again to deny a fare increase to adjust
for post-war inflation, LARY, won an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court for a two cent fare incfease.^'

The five cent fare had provided a good return for the
trolley companies' investors in the early years of the
century.

Before World War I, fare increases were opposed

partly because it was assumed that operating expenses would

decrease over time because rail transportation was virtually
the only means of practical transportation available to the
. c'

■

■

■

, ■

■
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public, and operating efficiencies would be realized as the

number of riders increased.

But by 1914, LARY and the

17

PacifIg Electric began to experience competition from pri
vately owned automobiles as well as a new form of public
transportation, the "jitney."

Initially, jitneys were

privately-owned automobiles which were used by their entre

preneurial owners to offer taxi-like services.

By 1915 a

reported 1800 jitneys in the city carried 150,000 passengers

each day.^®

Jitneys operated along the same routes as the

streetcars and had coitipetitive fares and better maneuver

ability (they were not dependent upon tracks).
They quickly became popular with the public because
they had several advantages over the streetcars:

they could

flit in and out of traffic; and although they usually trav
eled along the same routes as the trolleys, they could, if

required, leave the standard route and deliver a passenger
directly to his own home; they had the same five cent fare
as the trolleys; and, finally, their popularity was enhanced

by the very novelty of the automobile.^®

In addition to

filtering off a significant number of streetcar passengers,

when they first appeared on the streets of Los Angeles,
jitneys were an annoyance to LARY and the Pacific Electric
because they were unregulated and paid neither state nor

local taxes and only nominal business licensing fees.

The

initial reasoning behind the lack of regulation was that the
city's Board of Public Utilities was willing to treat the
developing trade as an experiment in an alternate form of

transportation,®®
■ ''n.

■ / la

Part of what inade the increased GompetitiQn from jit-^

neys and other automobiles so frustrating to LARY and th®
Pacific Electric, was that the traction companies were bound

by their franchise agreemehts to pave and maintain the
streets alohg which their linSs ran.

They, then, provided

their competitioh with the vety means to compete, and the

more cohgested the streets became with automobile traffic,
the less efficiently the streetcars could operate.

All of

this limited the traction companies* ability to earn what
they believed to be a fair return on their investment.

Late In 1914 the Pacific Electric and LARY appealed to
the city council to enact legislation to regulate the jit
neys as public utilities.

In March 1915, an ordinance was

passed which required jitney bperators to obtain a permit to

operate in a specific territory and route and to carry
insurance.

The jitney operators protested by appealing for

relief from this regulation through a city-wide referendum,

but in the face of an organized opposition from the traction

companies and their employees, the challenge failed.^"

Over

the next three yeairs, even more restrictive ordinances were
passed.

In 1917, jitneys were barred from operating in the

central downtown business district in an effort to reduce

traffic congestion, and the final blow came during the
summer of 1918 when the Los Angeles Board of Utilities

voided all jitney licenses adjacent to trolley tracks.

With

access to these popular routes denied, the jitney operators

could not sustain their business and jitney service disap
peared.

Although their services had been popular, the jitney

operators had not been: brganized enough to withstand the^
objections of the traction companies.

^

And while many pas

sengers had utilized the jitneys because they were dissatis

fied with streetcar services, public policy had turned
against jitneys only when it was determined that they did
not provide an efficient alternative to the trolleys.

A

similar public policy induced scenario would unfold later
when the trolleys themselves fell out of fashion and favor.

Even as the jitneys faded from competition, the trolley
companies came to realize the more formidable challenge
posed by the personal automobile.

In the first fifteen : : ;

years of the twentieth century, autos were primarily gadgets
owned by the wealthy.

Interurban trolleys were still the

most efficient and popular means of travel for the working
class, but that was changing as automobiles became more

affordable and ownership more common.

The railway companies appealed to the California Public

Utilities Commission in 1919 for permission to institute a

fare increase to help recover increased operating costs
resulting from the effects of World War I. Labor shortages

had pushed up wages^^ and many of the commodities needed to
support operations had become scarce and expensive.

By 1918

the operating cost ratio for LARY increased from sixty-nine

percent to eighty-three percent/ and both it and the PE were
showing a net income deficit.

In responding to the requests, the commission set a
precedent which played a fundamental role in the failure of
the trolley system in later years.

It decided that an

increase was not in the public's best interests and denied
the fare increase recommending instead that the railways
find more efficient methods of operation.

It suggested that

lines be rerouted and technology implemented in the form of
one-man operated safety cars instead of the two-man cars

commonly used.

The commission determined that these cost

cutting measures would result in a $1.5 million savings
which, in turn, would cover expenses, fixed costs, and

finance the suggested capital improvements.^®

It also

stipulated that only if the changes were implemented would
the commission consider a future fare increase.

As much as

it needed the fare increase, the Pacific Electric could not
employ one-man cars because of existing labor union agree
ments. LARY did its best to meet the commission's demands,

but the savings generated by the changes were lost to infla
tion.

It filed another request for an increase in 1921, but

the commission made approval of a one cent increase contin
gent upon the implementation of further cost savings mea
sures by the railway.

LARY officials decided to forgo the

increase and to hope that better economic conditions would
return.^'
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The commission did make one concession to the trolleys

by requesting municipalities served by LARY and the Pacific
Electric to relieve the traction companies of their obliga
tions to pave the streets along their routes.

The appeal

was largely ignored, however, as civic leaders realized that
their constituents' taxes would have to be raised in order

to maintain the roadS if the railroads were ho longer re
quired to provide the service.

They decided to continue the

railways' obligations to pave rather than raise taxes on

residents within their districts.^®

Street Congestion

As early as 1910 there were reports of heavy street

traffic congestion in downtown Los Angeles.

Automobiles

were becoming so popular that in 1914 the state of Califor
nia began tracking the number of registered automobiles

within the state.

The congestion caused by automobile

traffic downtown severely impacted the efficiency of the
trolley lines because the trolleys did not haVe an exclusive
right-of-way on most of the intraurban lines arid had to

conterid with the same traffic as everybody else and had the
additiorial hiridrance of being tied to the rails.

The

streetcars could riot move from lane to lane as horse-drawn

conveyances and later autos and buses could, and the slower

the trolleys got, the more passengers they lost.

The traction companies were caught in the middle of an
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impossible situation.

On the one hand, they were facing

demands from the citizens of Los Angeles to improve effi

ciency and accommodations and to expand the area serviced.
On the other hand, they were barred by the CPtJC from in
creasing fares to finance improvements.

When the railway

companies failed to respond to their demands, residents
complained to the CPUG, asking the agency to require the
traction companies to make the improvements.

Utility com

missioners could not force the railways to make the changes

and even made matters worse by refusing to authorize in

creases without making them contingent on the implementation
of some other program with which the railways could not

comply.

It is no wonder that residents began to find and

utilize alternative means of transportation:
The people gave up on the politicians and
took reform into their own hands by claiming
the right to their own private means of
transport. The automobile therefore became a
symbol of the democratic impulse that had
originally sparked the progressive move
ment.^®

Los Angeles city planners failed to recognize the
negative impact the automobile could have on transit within

the city until it was too late.

They had estimated that the

number of automobiles in Los Angeles County would peak at

100,000: by 1924 there were more than 500,000." They also
failed to realize the positive effect that a well-organized,

publicly supported public transportation system could have.
During the same period that other American and European
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metropolitan authorities were constructing publicly financed
subway and elevated intra- and interurban transit systems,
Los Angeles continually rejected proposals by LARY and the

Pacific Electric to finance improvements to the infrastruc
ture of their companies.
Heavy traffic congestion in downtown adversely affected

businesses as access to their premises was limited by avail
able parking.

As the popularity of automobiles increased,

businesses began to move from the center of the city out to
developing suburban business districts.

Between 1920 and

1924 the number of registered automobiles in Los Angeles
County increased from less than 200,000 to more than
500,000.

By 1924 approximately 262,000 automobiles traveled

through downtown Los Angeles daily: the city's streets were

jammed.

Streetcars, routed on the most heavily traveled

streets, were hampered by autos which refused to yield the

right-of-way and by unthinking pedestrians who constantly
crossed the streets in front of the moving streetcars.

Only once was serious consideration given to the pur

chase of LARY by the city when late in 1925 it opened nego
tiations with Henry Huntington to bring the intraurban line

under public ownership.

Proponents of the idea pointed out

that the company could not afford capital improvements

without raising fares, but that under public ownership, some
of its expenses could be reduced through lower cost munici
pal bonds and the cessation of the paving requirements of

■
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the franchise agreements and at the same time, the five cent

fare could be maintained.

The Los Angeles Times ihitially

opposed the plan as socialistic, but its opppsition never
really caught oh as the city had already succeeded in

municipalizing its water, electricity and gas services.

In attempting to determine what a fair purchase price wbuld
be, the city failed to act quickly enough.

Huntington died

in May 1927 and his estate went into probate.

Negotiations

were never reopened as the plan's supporters lost inter
est,.'*'*■■ ■

Even though the trolleys offered reasonably efficient
and inexpensive service, Los Angeles residents had chosen
automobiles early and enthusiastically because they were
comfortable, private, and they could go just about anywhere
the driver wantbd to go.

When compared to the national

average, Los Angeles far exceeded other cities in the number
of cars per resident; as early as 1915 the national mean was
one car per forty-three residents while Los Angeles had one

for every eight.'*®

By 1925, the ratio of cars to people

nationally was 1:6, but in Los Angeles it was 1:2.*®
Table 2 helps to illustrate just how much more dependent Los
Angeles residents were on automobiles than the average

American by comparing the number of residents per automobile

in the United States, Chicago and Los Angeles.
Just as the streetcar had contributed to the region's

dispersed nature of settlement, the automobile had its own

.
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TABLE 2

.

Residents Per Automobile

United States

Los Angeles

Chicago

1915

. . . .

43.1

8.2

61,0

1920

. . . .

13.1

3.6

30.0

1925

. . . .

6.6

1.8

11.0

1930

. . . .

5.3

1.5

8.0

1935

. . . .

5.6

1-6

NA

1940

. . . .

4.8

. 1.4 ■ ■

NA

■
■

■ ■' 'v'-

Source:Scott L. Bottles ^ Los Anaeles and the Automobile
(Los Angeles, The University of California Press, 1987),
,93'.

effect on the spatial development of the region by making it

possible to fill in the spaces between radiating railroad
lines which had previously been inconvenient to settle.

It

also increased the accessibility to those area^ where
streetcars had never reached.

With increased usage, automo

bile drivers demanded more and better roads and highways.
Their demands generated a change in public transportation

policy whereby public agencies began using tax dollars to
construct and maintain roadways rather than waiting for

private enterprise to provide.^'
The provision of better roads further affected the
operating efficiency of LARY and the Pacific EleCtfic.

Once

protected right-of-ways were violated by roads crossing the
tracks at grade level and over which motorists would some
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times race the trolley or just assume the right-of-way.

The

increase in cross traffic on formerly protected or rural

routes meant that the motormen operating the trolleys needed
to slow their traveling speed in order to avoid the possi

bility of collisions.

While there were some instances of

cooperation between the railroads and public entities to
build over- and undercrossings, there were too few of them

built and too many automobiles to positively affect the
streetcars' operations.

A telling example of the sacrifice of the interurban in
favor of the automobile Was the demand by the motoring

public to pave around the rails of the Long Beach line.

i?he

line had been constructed in 1902 with a protected right-of
way and included separate public roadways on either side of
the tracks which allowed the Pacific Electric to travel at

its highest possible speed and efficiency.

In the 1920s,

however, the public demanded a change, and although the PE

argued that its efficiency would be deeply and negatively
affected, the right-of-way was eliminated and pavement laid
around the tracks.

The result, a wide boulevaird, increased

accessibility and movement for automobiles, but it also

increased the traveling time for Pacific Electric riders by
about thirty percent which prompted many passengers to

abandon the Red Cars in favor of their own automobiles.^®
In the 1920s the interurban began to face competition

from privately and municipaliy owned motorbuses.
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Like the

jitneys which preceded them, the buses tended to travel the
same routes as the streetcars because they were the most

heavily traveled.

Instead of supplementing and enhancing

the Pacific Electric's and LARY's services by operating
within areas where the streetcars could not reach, the buses

offered direct competition to the streetcars.

The continued

lack of efficiency encouraged trolley passengers to use
other forms of transportation and further reduced the trac

tion companies' revenues.^®

The Public Utilities Commission

could do nothing for the traction companies to control the

competition from buses because the buses were out of the
commission's jurisdiction.
Although the streetcar companies had successfully

challenged competition from the jitney trade in the previous

decade, buses posed a more difficult challenge because they
operated in a wider area than the jitneys had.

Jitneys had

operated almost exclusively within the city of Los Angeles
and, for the most part, were independently owned and oper

ated.

Buses, on the other hand, were either municipally

owned and operated within the confines of the communities

for which they were purchased, or were independently owned
and operated between the various communities.

There was no

single entity to which the traction companies could appeal

to receive relief from competitive pressures.

Furthermore,

the Los Angeles City Council had imposed regulations upon
the jitney trade because jitneys were adding undesirable
28'' ■

traffic to downtown streets, buses were apparently not
50

having the same effect.
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UNION STATION CONTROVERSY

Traffic in downtown Los Angeles had emerged as a major

planning problem by the first half of the 1920s.

Most of

the streets had been laid out during an era when horse drawn

wagons and the trolleys had easily shared the space.

With

rapid population growth and the introduction of large num
bers of automobiles, the streets were not able to accommo
date the resulting volume of congestion.

Neither automo

biles nor streetcars could negotiate the streets at a con
sistent pace and parking had become almost impossible.

The

streetcar system was severely impacted and "slowly dying of

congestion."®^
Rather than encouraging the use of the potentially more

efficient public transportation system, the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors decided that the use of downtown
streets needed to be limited to automobile traffic.

In 1923

it set up a regional planning commission charged with devel
oping an integrated countywide highway system.

In 1924

voters elected to establish what was called the "Major
Traffic Street Plan" which, when completed, was to include

recommendations for widening streets and otherwise enhancing

the movement of traffic through the city's streets.®^
Although downtown businessmen did not want to admit it,

there was a shift developing in which downtown Los Angeles
was fading as the dominant central business district and

being replaced by smaller business districts throughout the
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region.

Between 1923 and 1931 the number of people entering

downtown Los Angeles fell by twenty-four percent despite a

general population increase in the metropolitan area." The
Pacific Electric was not equipped to accommodate this change
because its services operated out of a central hub located
in downtown and could not proyide direct service between
ma:ny of the communities which were located on separate
radials.

Huntington's Pacific Electric had cbhtributed much to
population dispersal in the Los Angeles area, and it was its

sprawling nature that made the Pa;cific Electric's chief

competitor, the automobile, so popular.

Initially, people

had moved to the suburbs located along the PE's tracks.

However, as automobile ownership became common, developers
were able to construct homes which were far from existing PE

lines but which were easily accessible to automobiles.
Another of the many problems that affected the effi

ciency of the streetcars within the city was that they
almost always shared the street with other vehicles and

pedestrians.

Automobiles routinely traveled on the street

car tracks and obstructed the movement of the trolleys.

Pedestrians frequently crossed in front of moving trolleys
slowing already sluggish progress.

Streetcar passengers

became frustrated with the uncomfprtable and decaying condi

tions of aging trolley cars, and many eventually stopped
riding them in favor of their own automobiles in which, at
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minimum, they could travel at the same speed the trolleys
did but in greater comfort.

By the mid twenties, enterprising businessmen recog
nized that downtown Los Angeles was crowded and inconyenient
to shoppers and moved all or part of their businesses out of

the downtown area to outlying commercial centers.

Bull

ock's Wilshire, for example, opened its doors in 1928 a few
miles west of downtown.

It immediately demonstrated that it

possessed a distinct advantage for motorists over downtown

stores because it provided a large parking lot right next to

the store for the cohvenience of its shoppers."
In 1924 the Los Angeles City Council appointed the firm

of Kelker, De Leuw & Company to develop a rapid transit plan
for the city.

Known as the Kelker-De Leuw Report, the

firm's conclusions were submitted to the city in 1925.

The

report advised that a reduction in downtown congestion could
be achieved by segregating streetcar traffic from automobile

traffic by creating rapid transit lines with protected

right-of-ways via elevated tracks, subway routes, and lim
ited stops.

This would provide speedy and efficient trans

portation to downtown from outlying communities as well as

improved automobile traffic flow on the city's street.

The

report also acknowledged the continuing importance of
streetcars and interurbans to other communities in the

region as a part of an integrated system.

Perhaps because it had been commissioned by the city,

32

the Kelker-De Leuw Report's primary flaw was that it assumed
the continuing importance of downtown Los Angeles as a

destination, but the automobile had already made this as
sumption obsolete.

It had become much more convenient and

common for shoppers to frequent the stores and other busi
nesses which were springing up on the periphery of the city
and in its surrounding communities.

In addition to the

convenience of doing business locally rather than downtown,

the idea of small, autonomous communities appealed to thOse

who had cOme to Galifornia to escape the densely populated
cities of the east in pursuit of a healthy; uncrowded life

style.

These people were not interested in fuhding a rapid

transit plan which did not satisfy their own interpretation

of the Southern California lifestyle."
One of the more important features of the Kelker-De

Leuw Report as it related to the trolleys, was that it
warned that a healthy rapid transit system could not be

self-supporting in an area of low population density and

that public subsidization was essential to its success in
Los Angeles.

It cited New York, Boston and Philadelphia, as

examples of cities which had provided public funding for

their rapid transit plans and had achieved their objectives.

Only with some form of public funding, the report argued,
could fares be kept reasonable and serve as wide an area as
required.

Soon after the report was presented, a Citizens' Rapid

■
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Transit Committee was formed to study and implement the

report's recommendations.

Committee members included repre

sentatives from various civic organizations, the Pacific
Electric and Los Angeles Railway, members of the city coun

cil and other city officials.®®

During this review period,

opposition quickly formed because of the Los Angeles Times'
focus on Kelker-De Leuw's recommendation to construct ele

vated right-of-ways for the trolleys.

The opening of the

rapid transit issue also regenerated interest in the con
struction of a hew centralized train station for the city

which would eliminate the separate stations currently in use

by Southern Pacific, Santa Fe and Union Pacific and provide
access for passengers wanting to transfer to Pacific Elec
tric trains.

In 1925, the city council endorsed a plan to

establish just such a terminal at the "Plaza" site a few
blocks from the new city hall building, parallel to the

banks of the Los Angeles River.

The question of building a

union station and, if built, whether it should be located at
the Plaza site was put on an April 1926 ballot.

The railroads, not wanting the expense of building a
new station, submitted a plan of their own.

They offered to

build elevated lines to the Pacific Electric terminal build

ing and protected walkways for travelers to use when moving
between the various stations.

Although it would not be required to move its opera

tions to the proposed union station, the Pacific Electric
34; '

would be affected by the change.

The plan did airow for the

future possibility of constructing a subway access to the
station for the PE, but in the meantime, service to the new
station would have to be provided via additional surface

grade crossings.

The Los Anaeles Times reported that Pa

cific Electric officials had informed the Public Utilities

Commission that if the Plaza plan were implemented, it would
probably have to move its main line operation to the east

side Of the Los Angeles River to escape the worst of down

town congestion.^®
The railroads' proposal was opposed by the public in

general and by Harry Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles
Times, in particular.

Chandler used the newspaper to wage a

campaign against the railroads by focusing on two key is
sues: the inconvenience to travelers of the railroads'

multistation system and the proposed introduction of ele
vated lines in the city.

In the weeks prior to the elec

tion, the Times ran numerous frbnt page articles about

elevated lines in cities on the east coast emphasizing their
negative aspects such as the noise, how they darkened the
streets over Which they ran, and how difficult they were to

access when accidents occurred.

Accompanying the articles

were photographs depicting long, dark blocks of streets
overshadowed by elevated tracks.

The day before the elec

tion, the railroads and their supporters placed a threequarters page ad in the Times which included a statement

signed by the presidents of the four railroads which de
clared that elevated lines in Los Angeles meant altered

grade crossings such as under- and overcrossings, not miles
of trestles raised to run longitudinally over the streets of

Los Angeles as the Times had implied.®" The voters cast
their ballots in favor of the union station and the Plaza

site plans.

Although it was not immediately apparent, the election
had at least two damaging long term effects on the Pacific
Electric's future:

first, the Kelker-De Leuw Report's

recommendation for public subsidization of rapid transit had
been buried and all but forgotten in the station contro
versy; and second, the failure of the plan for elevated
lines dashed its chances of being able to compete success

fully against the automobile.

Without the elevated lines

and subways, the Pacific Electric could not reasonably
improve its operational efficiency because it simply could
not move its cars efficiently through the city's traffic
entanglements.

The Kelker-De Leuw Report had anticipated correctly

what would happen if the streetcar companies were not pub

licly subsidized.

The report had indicated that a streetcar

system could either be privately funded and provide quality,
limited service with high fares or it could be publicly

funded and provide extensive service with reasonable fares.
The Los Angeles streetcar companies could accomplish neither
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because they could not raise their fares without the ap

proval of the Public Utilities Commission which, despite
numerous requests, had not authorized an increase in years.
Furthermore, without public subsidies, it became increas
ingly difficult for the traction companies to service their
current lines even as area residents continued to criticize

the PE for not expanding into newly developed areas.
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THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The Great Depression dealt the trolley system a severe

financial blow.

Patronage fell sharply and the Pacific

Electric's operating revenues fell to a twenty year low

while the L.A. Railway's reached a ten year low.®^

Between

1931 and 1949 the PE suffered average losses of two million
dollars per year, and while not as great, LARY also posted
losses during the Depression years.

The deficits made it

increasingly difficult for the companies to make capital

improvements and even to maintain existing lines properly.
While LARY had been granted a two cent fare increase in

1927, it used the increased revenues to improve its balance
sheet instead of rolling them back into the business by
making capital improvements and upgrading customer services.

The Pacific Electric had also requested a fare increase at
the same time but was denied based on the CPUC's determina

tion that higher fares would lead to losses in ridership.

The commission actually recommended that the PE reduce its
fa:res on one of its routes in order to encourage new riders.

The PE complied and when this failed to generate the hoped

for increase in ridership the commission relented and per
mitted the fare increase.

Unfortunately, this time the

commission's predictions were realized as both patronage and
revenues fell after the fares were raised.

Both LARY and

the Pacific Electric decided that it was necessary to close
unprofitable lines.

The commission agreed with the traction
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companies* decision and authorized the closing and disman

tling of many lines in the late 1920s and through the
1930s.

Neither the Pacific Electric nor LARY had the financial

reserves necessary to dO more than survive the Depression
although the Pacific Electric had the advantage of the
Southern Pacific's financial backing.

The infrastructure of

both companies suffered as rolling stock and rails aged.
Even as services were reduced or suspended on lightly trav

eled lines, the public never fully understood the problems
the traction companies faced and continued to lodge com
plaints about the lack of crosstown lines and other ser
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Vices.

Although it might have seemed practical during this
period of economic distress for people to abandon their

automobiles and turn to the more cost-efficient public

transportation system, this did not happen.

The automobile

had become a necessity rather than a luxury by this time,
and while annual car sales fell seventy-five percent between
1929 and 1932, car registrations fell only ten percent which

indicates that while people were willing to delay the pur

chase of a new vehicle, they were not as receptive to the

idea of giving up the one they already owned.®®
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DECLINING OPERATIONS

Throughout the 1930s the Pacific Electric terminated
service on unprofitable lines.

Each time services con

tracted, the company lost more passengers and was criticized
for not attempting to attract business by putting new cars
into service or by expanding into new communities.

The

public apparently could not comprehend the idea that a
railrdad company did not have the funds to finance expansion
projects.

Worse, the Public Utilities Commission compounded

the problem by consistently siding with public by refusing
to authorize fare increases which, over time, could have

financed expansion and other improvement projects.

Most people seemed to have lost interest in the trol
leys as an important factor in the regional transportation
system.

Periodically downtown advocates and city officials

formed committees to investigate the rapid transit plan, but
whenever the guestion of financing the implementation arose,

proposals which included public bond measures or increased
property assessments were rejected.

There was a general

distrust toward the idea of rapid transit which stemmed from
a resentment toward downtown advocates by those living in

surrounding communities.

There was also an assumption by

the public that rail-based transportation was within the

realm of private enterprise and that any changes to it be

privately financed even though the trolleys were regulated

by a public agency that illogically and regularly denied
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them the ability to charge a fair price for their services.

Between the competing priorities and assumptions of the
public, the rapid rail transit plans were always put aside
and the trolley companies were virtually powerless to im

prove their situation.
World War TI provided a temporary resurgence of popu
larity for the streetcar system when gasoline and rubber
shortages made it difficult for people to operate their
private automobiles.

The streetcars were put into extremely

heavy use during the war.

In addition to regular passenger

traffic, they were used to transport large groups of sol
diers and sailors from the trains at Union Station to their

bases and other duty posts in the Southland.®®

The Pacific

Electric experienced so large an increase in the number of

passengers that it had to take its old wooden cars out of

storage and borrow additional rolling stock from other
cities in order to meet demand.®'

Soon after the end of the

war, however, residents returned to their old habits and the

convenience of their personal automobiles.

In 1946, the Pacific Electric requested approval for
its first post-war fare increase to cover rising operating
costs.

The Public Utilities Commission granted the request,

but it also ordered the company to upgrade its equipment

before any additional requestis would be approved.®®

While

the company would have liked to follow the directive, it

still did not have the financial reserves necessary to
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finance an upgrade.

The fare increase merely kept it in

operation.

The Pacific Electric made its final attempt to maintain

a position as a viable transportation alternative in 1947
when it tried to obtain city and state funds to finance the

construction of a right-of-way for the Pacific Electric down
the center of the new Hollywood Freeway which was still in
the planning stage.

The PE's president, Oscar Smith, be

lieved that, if successful, a double-tracked line running
down this freeway would serve as a model for future coopera

tive projects.

He estimated that the railway could trans

port twice as many people per hour along its right-of-way as
the eight lanes of automobile traffic.

In spite of its

obvious utility, the proposal was rejected as too costly

both in terms of money and time because it was determined
that construction on the freeway would have to be delayed in

order to introduce the rail lines into the project.®®
In response to the directive to upgrade from the CPUC

and the failure of the Hollywood Freeway proposal. Pacific
Electric officials began to seriously evaluate their posi
tion in the passenger rail service market.

Even before the

war, its rolling stock was outdated and worn because the

company had not had the funds to make improvements.

During

the war, the continuous, heavy usage had almost worn out the
trolley cars, but the company could not update the equipment
because of materials shortages caused by the war.

42

As soon

as the war was over, ridership had fallen off again and
company officials recognized that there was little prospect

for improvement in the future.

The Pacific Electric made

the decision in 1953 to sell its passenger operations to
Metropolitan Goach Lines, a bus service provider in the
Southern California region.

Metropolitan operated the

Pacific Electric at a loss for five years before it sold the
system to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority

(LAMTA), a state-owned agency, which oversaw the actual

demise of the interurban after it announced the suspension

of passenger trolley service in 1961.'*'
LARY experienced a similar fate.

In 1940 it had begun

making arrangements to convert from a fixed rail service to
a motorbus service.

Company officials believed this change

would position the company to take advantage of the next
phase of intraurban mass transit.

Before the buses could be

purchased, however. World War II broke out and modernization

plans had to be put on hold, and then in 1944 the Huntington

estate sold LARY to American City Lines, a subsidiary of

National City Lines which owned transit systems nationwide.
American City Lines changed LARY's name to American Transit

Lines and implemented the modernization plans set forth by
LARY in 1940, completing the transformation of the company
from a streetcar line to bus service before the company was

sold again to LAMTA ih 1958.^^
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THE CONSPIRACY THEORY

As streetcar companies across the nation were sold and
their operations converted to bus service, there arose a

popular belief that a group of auto, rubber, and oil compa
nies had conspired over the yeats to remove trolleys from
competition in the transportation industry.

There is little

evidence of the existence of an actual conspiracy. If,

however, one is inclined to distrust the business practices

of large corporations, then the theory is appealing, but it

does not withstand cortiparison to the facts of the situation
in the Los Angeles region.
The conspiracy theory argues that streetcar Systems
were sold and converted to motorbus service nationwide

beginning in the 1920s and through the early 1960s, but it

is also true, but infrequently mentioned, that the Pacific
Electric and LARY had been using buses to augment their rail

service since the early 192Os'^ and LARY had planned to
modernize its operations with buses before World War II.

It

is also true that many of the nations' streetcar companies

were purchased by National City Lines (NCL) which was a

subsidiary of General Motors, and that National City Lines
purchased GM buses to operate in its franchises.

What is

largely ignored, however, is the fact that when NCL pur
chased many of these lines nationwide, the trolleys were

often in deep financial distress because of a declining

market:

this was the case in Los Angeles.
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National City

Lines was not organized until 1936 and did not have any
connection with LARY or the Pacific Electric until the late
1940s.: .

As this examination has shown, the Pacific Electric

experienced decades of financial troubles before it decided
to give up on passenger service.

There had beeh frequent

opportunities available for the public to fund or otherwise
subsidize improvements and expansion of the streetcar ser
vices, but these were consistently rejected for various
reasons: short-sighted fare decisions made by the Public
Utilities Commission; a general public objection to fund

privately owned companies; and a long-standing struggle
between the downtown advocates and those who preferred
decentralization and viewed rapid transit as a ploy by

downtown to increase its importance at the expense of outly
ing communities.

In 1974 Bradford C. Snell gained widespread recognition
when he presented a report entitled "American Ground Trans

port" to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Committee oh the Judiciary.

In this

report, he attempted to explain how General Motors, Ford and
Chrysler "eliminated competition among themselves, secured
control over rival bus and rail industries, and then maxi

mized profits by substituting cars and trucks for trains,
streetcars, subways and buses.

He reported that in the mid-twenties, GM needed to

45'

secure a new market for itself beqause the private automo
bile industry had become saturated.

To that end, GM pur

chased Yellow Coach Lines in 1925 and began production of
motor buses.

In 1925, it was involved in the formation of

Greyhound Corporation which, according to Snell, had as its

purpose the conversion of passenger rail services to inter^

city bus service.

In 1932, GM "undertook the direct opera

tion and conversion of interurban railways and local elec

tric streetcar and trolleybus systems to city bus opera

tions."'^

Snell further contended that it was GM's ultimate

inteht to replace buses with automobiles by making buses so

inconvenient and uncomfortable that passengers would abandon

them in favor of private cars.'®
Snell explained that GM formed United Cities Motor

Transit (UCMT) specifically to purchase and convert street
car systems to bus service.

UCMT was successful in several

cities where it established a pattern of purchasing the
streetqar line, converting its services to bus service, then

reselling the company before moving on to the next city.
UCMT and GM were censured in 1935 by the American Transit

Association (ATA) for similui^ activities in Portland in
which GM as a bus manufacturer was deemed to be self-serv

ing.

As a result of the ATA criticism, UCMT Was dissolved.

In the next year, however, Snell argued that three GM and

several Greyhound executives formed National City Lines to

perform the same service that UCMT had.'®
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The idea of an

interindustry conspiracy emerged because GM and Firestone
Rubber and Tire owned stock in NGL and Standard Oil of

California, Mack Truck, and Phillips Petroleum owned stock

in NCL's subsidiary, American city Lines.

National City

Lines had agreements with all of these companies to purchase

their products to fill its equipment and supply needs.
Between 1936 and 1949 more than one hundred electric transit

systems in forty-five cities had been purchased and con
verted to GM buses.

While the facts of the above situation are true,

Snell's accusations that the actions of all of the compa

nies, but GM in particular, were performed with the specific

intent to destroy passenger rail service ignores the possi
bility that GM did what all good businesses do by recogniz

ing a need in the marketplace and devising a means to fill
that need while earning a profit from it at the same time.

Snell assumes, incorrectly, that all of the trolley systems

that NCL and its subsidiaries purchased were healthy con
cerns which had years of usefulness and profit ahead of them
and which also had no choice in the matter of their sales.

He and others Who favor the conspiracy theory fail to ac
knowledge that in some cases, people had already stopped

using the streeitcars in favor of their personal automobiles
long before UCMT or NCL Were even thought of.

In Los An

geles this trend had been apparent since the mid 1920s and
yet the Southern Pacific maintained its ownership of the
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Pacific Electric until 1948 when it decided that its profit
potential had been lost.

Snell's arguments also fail to include recognition of
the effects of local public policy on the ability of street
car systems to survive.

In cities where municipalization of

transit systems took place when the issue was popular

amongst the citizens, the systems tended to decline less

than they did elsewhere.'' In other words, where the public
agreed there was value to rail-based passenger service, that

service remained in operation.

Wherever the service was

assigned little overall value, it disappeared.

In Los

Angeles, municipalization had not occurred because the city
had acted too slowly in the negotiations to purchase LARY
when it had the chance between 1925 and 1927, and because by
the time the city was prepared to consider the idea seri

ously, rail-based rapid transit had already lost much of its
significance.

There was little real need to keep the trol

leys going because the automobile provided a viable, seem
ingly efficient, and comfortable alternative form of trans
portation.
In Los Angeles, people had turned away from the street

cars long before NCL came into town.

Automobiles were

consistently given priority over other means of transporta
tion because residents wanted it that way.

They approved

projects which removed the streetcars' right-of-ways, which
allowed grade crossings on formerly high speed interurban
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tracks, widened streets and improved traffic flow, financed
freeway construction with public funds, and provided free

ways with the protected right-of-ways which had been denied
to the Pacific Electric for years.

They also repeatedly

refused to fund improvements on the streetcar lines by

failing to support fare increase requests.

It is then fair

to state that, at least in Los Angeles, GM was not responsi
ble for the death of the streetcar system, and that in fact,

it was actually the public through its repeated demonstra

tion of a preference for the automobile and the California
Public Utilities Commission with its short-sighted decisions
which made it virtually impossible for the trolleys to

survive, much less compete, against the automobile.
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EPILOGUE

After decades of massive freeway construction designed

to relieve traffic congestion and in an effort to reduce
smog emissions, Los Angeles and its environs turned once
again to the idea of rail-based commuter service in the
early 1990s when it launched a new light rail trolley system
to serve the area.

Ironically, the first new trolley line to be put into

service in July, 1990 was the Blue Line which closely fol
lows the Pacific Electric's old Long Beach line.

Since the

Blue line opened, the system has grown rapidly and combines
electric powered light rail trolleys and subways that within
Los Angeles are collectively known as Metrorail with a

regional network of diesel powered trains known as Metrolink
which serve communities outside the immediate vicinity of
Los Angeles.

The Blue Line initially offered trains at ten-minute
intervals during peak commuting periods and at 15 minute
intervals at other times.

The initial fare was set at $1.10

per one-way trip, the same as bus fare.'®

While transit

officials were concerned that the fares might be too high,
they are heavily subsidized.

In the first year of its

operation, the Blue Line was expected to bring in only about
five percent of its operating budget through fares.

In

contrast, the Rapid Transit District's (RTD) buses typically
returned approximately forty percent of their operating
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budget through fares.'®

Aftfer two years of operation,

however, the Blue Line was receiving about thirteen percent

of its operating budget from fares which was a much better

return than anticipated.®®
The attitude toward funding rapid rail transit changed
drastically between the time the Pacific Electric went out
of business and the inauguration of Metrorail's service.

The public is currently fiscally and politically supportive

of the rail-based system and has voted in favor of increased
sales and gasoline taxes, approved bond measures and sup

ported lobbying for federal funding.®^
While Metrorail has been successful in attracting
riders, a survey done in 1992 during the second year of the
Blue Line's operation showed that sixty-four percent of its
passengers had previously taken the bus as their primary
form of commuter transportation.

By switching from bus to

rail, they were actually utilizing a more expensive form of
transportation than the one they had used before.

The

survey also showed that thirty-six percent of the riders had

previously used their cars.

At the time the survey was

taken, it was estimated that 35,600 people rode the Blue

Line each weekday and that about 5,800 cars were kept off

the freeways each day.®^

Metrolink proved even more suc

cessful at attracting commuters out of their autos and onto

the trains.

A 1993 survey of Metrolink riders showed that

sixty-five percent of its riders had formerly commuted alone
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in their private automobiles which translated into remoying
approximately 16,000 cars each week from the region's free
ways.

About half of those surveyed rated Metrolink as a

better value than commuting by auto even though they be

lieved that it cost them more out of pocket than driving
did.®^

Other than the old right-of-ways and that it is railbased, the current system of rapid rail transit bears little
resemblance to the old Pacific Electric and LARY systems.

Because it is publicly owned and operated this system has a
better chance for survival as it does not have to compete

with the automobile directly as its predecessors did.

It

will also be protected from competitive pressures until the

priorities of the voting public shift again.

52

APPENDIX A: SYMBOL OF LOS ANGELES

Over the years the Pacific Electric's cars became so

widely known that they came to represent Southern California
symbolically in popular culture.

Merely showing them in the

round of a movie or mentioning them in descriptiYe
passages of a novel helped to establish a scene in the Los

Angeles area.

People might not consciously realize that a

trolley car had appeared on the screen because the street

were such an integral part of Los Angeles life that

cars

they did not need to be emphasized but could be accepted as
i

a sutjtle confirmation of location; just as one would not
have to explain a visual reference to the subway in a story

set i|n New York City or the cable cars in san FrancisGo, one
did not need to explain the appearance of the Big Red Cars
in Los Angeles.

In "Singin' in the Rain," the 1952 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
musical set in the late 1920s, the main character is a

silent screen actor who finds it necessary to flee a horde
of adoring fans after the premiere of his latest film.

The

only laVailable means of escape is to leap atop a passing

Pacific Electric Railway car.

He runs along the top of the

trolley as it moves down the Hollywood street, then jumps
into a passing convertible automobile.

The trolley contin

ues on its way in the opposite direction.
Raymond Chandler referred to the streetcars casually in

his hoyels about the darker side of Los Angeles.
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In 1939•s

The Big Sleep/ he describes the backgrouhd as the character,
Philip Marlow, begins an investigation:
I finished my cigarette and lit another.

The

minutes dragged by. Horns tooted and grunted
on the boulevard. A big red interurban car
grumbled past. A traffic light gohged. The
blonde leaned on her elbow and cupped a hand
over her eyes and stared at me behind
it. .

In Farewell, My Lovely, another Chandler novel, the author

sets the scene in the Los Angeles detective's office by
briefly referring to the interurban:

A wedge of sunlight slipped over the edge of
the desk and fell noiselessly to the carpet.
Traffic lights bong-bonged outside on the
boulevard, interurban cars pounded by, a
typewriter clacked monotonously in the law
yer's office beyond the party wall. I had
filled and lit a pipe when the telephone rang

again.®®
While the Pacific Electric disappeared from the land

scape more than thirty years ago, contemporary authors
continue to use references to the system to set their sto

ries in time.

Stuart M. Kaminsky, a mystery writer, often

places his characters in Los Angeles during the forties and
fifties.

In one book. Buried Caesars, the main character

unexpectedly finds himself on the San Marino estate of Henry

Huntington.

Although Huntington had died years before the

character stumbles onto the estate, Kaminsky takes the time
to explain Huntington's significance as it related to the
character's experience:

Old man Huntington had put together the Pa
cific Electric Streetcar System, the big red
cars and the yellow cars, the . . . trollies
54

with the overhead cables that you cbuld

ride through the canyons for a dime.
"The world's wonderland lines," he
called it, and at its peak Huntington's
Pacific Electric carried more passengers

every day than the transit systems of

the five biggest cities combined.®® /
In another of Kaminsky's books. The Fala Factor, a

character makes a passing reference to attending an impor
tant meeting "with some folks at Pacific Electric Rail

way."®^

Although all of these examples include only a very

brief reference, they are sufficient to demonstrate how much
a part of everyday life the Pacific Electric played.

It is

an entity which readers can identify without much explana
tion.

The reference becomes part of the story without

causing interference.

The Disney movie, "Who Framed Roger Rabbit?", actually
introduces a form of the conspiracy theory of the demise of
the Red Care as a significant subplot.

The villain of the

piece, Judge Doom, buys the Red Cars specifically so that he
can remove them from service.

With the trolley out of the

way, people would be forced to use their automobiles on the

sbon to be built freeways which would, in turn, create a
paradise in which automobiles would generate demand for

innumerable roadside businesses such as gasoline stations,
garages, and fast food restaurants.

Judge Doom's vision

seemed unrealistic to the hero, Eddie Valiant, who did not

own an automobile and could not imagine the city without the
Red Cars.

In the end. Valiant thwarted Judge Doom's efforts

■
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to control Toon Town and his intention to resell it when the

freeway cut through.
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